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Global Pressures: Multinational 
Corporations, International 
Unionism, and NGOs
THE GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGE
The globalization of product, financial, and labor markets has made it easier 
for companies to produce many of the goods and services they sell wherever 
in the world the right skills can be found at the lowest cost. The desire to sell 
products worldwide has also created incentives for firms to have a presence in 
multiple countries. Together these facts have made labor relations in many 
industries global in scope. Globalization is of particular importance to emerg­
ing countries. Nearly 50 percent of the world’s manufacturing employment is 
now located in emerging countries.1
Globalization poses significant challenges to labor relations practices. His­
torically the laws, markets, institutions, norms, and practices of labor relations 
have developed on a national basis. Globalization has weakened, though not 
eliminated, the role of national systems of labor relations and given rise to a 
number of new institutions, structures, and processes for dealing with all of 
the labor relations functions discussed in previous chapters.
In this chapter we will discuss these new arrangements and the challenges 
globalization poses to labor relations. To do so we will use the framework laid 
out in chapter 1 for analyzing labor relations.
THE EFFECTS OF EXPANDING MARKETS
A key argument put forward by John R. Commons, one of the early theorists 
in industrial relations, was that as products and labor markets expanded in
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scope, unions and other institutions also needed to expand if they were to 
“take wages out of competition” by standardizing wages in labor markets in 
which they worked.2 As markets expanded from local to national levels, 
so did unions, labor laws, and management policies and practices. Com­
mons argued that failing to expand union coverage to the larger market would 
reduce workers’ bargaining power and put downward pressures on wages, 
what some now call a “race to the bottom.” Firms would move work to 
lower-wage regions or workers who were willing to work for wages below 
accepted rates in a community (or nation) would migrate to take jobs at 
lower rates.
Another environmental change—advances in communications technolo­
gies—also promoted globalization of employment, especially in services. Call 
centers, editing, accounting services, tax preparation, radiology (X-ray read­
ing), legal research, and document management are among the many services 
that are now available on a global basis “24—7.”
Demographic trends also support the globalization of work. Emerging 
countries have added a significant number of workers to the global labor force 
in recent years, increasing competition in the labor market for work (see the 
discussion in chapter 4). As education and skill levels increase in emerging 
countries and/or immigration rules are eased, competition for work at all oc­
cupational levels will continue to increase.
The Globalization of Business Strategies
This competitive process is now playing out on a global basis among multina­
tional firms. Over the last fifty years the number of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) has increased greatly, to the point that they now have a major impact 
on world commerce and the conduct of labor relations in nearly every 
country.
Every MNC must make strategic choices about where to locate different 
parts of their business and supply chain. This brings into play the role of busi­
ness strategies as a key factor shaping labor relations in developing countries. 
One key variable that influences the business strategy of an MNC are the 
wage levels at various potential production sites and countries. Although ac­
cess to resources and markets also influence business strategies, the expansion 
of trade and the increase in the number of MNCs has led to a steady move­
ment of manufacturing and service work from higher-wage countries to 
lower-wage countries and regions, and this movement is of special interest 
and importance to emerging countries. Box 11.1 illustrates the evolving busi­
ness strategy of Nike, one of the early firms to globalize its production of ap­
parel and athletic equipment.3
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BOX 11.1
Nike’s Global Business Model
Nike started operating as a company in 1964. Early on, its business 
model called for its products to be designed and marketed in the United 
States and manufactured abroad. First, it located manufacturing facilities 
in Japan. As Japan’s labor costs rose and Nike’s business expanded, the 
company moved production to Korea and later to lower-cost countries 
such as Indonesia, Vietnam, China, and parts of Latin America.
Nike did not own or manage the factories that produced its products. 
Instead, it contracted with supplier companies located in these various 
countries. In doing so, Nike and other firms that followed a similar 
strategy developed global supply chains. Today 600 contractors in 
forty-six different countries around the world supply Nike with prod­
ucts (http://nikeinc.com/pages/frequently-asked-questions).
The Nike story told in box 11.1 is similar to that of many other MNCs that 
have become household names, such as Siemens, Apple, General Electric, 
Zaras, and Hewlett Packard. Essentially all large firms that sell products that 
can be easily transported globally and/or that sell to global markets have global 
supply chains. The development of global supply chains offers strategic eco­
nomic development and business opportunities to emerging countries and to 
companies that specialize in contract manufacturing. Countries across the 
globe (and individual firms) compete for contracts from MNCs and the jobs 
that go with them by offering the lowest cost that is consistent with a com­
pany’s quality and delivery requirements. The effect of this is that competi­
tion in labor relations has become globalized.
The Pressure of Diversity on MNCs
Managing an MNC involves issues of cultural, legal, and institutional diver­
sity. Workers from various cultures often view work differently, attach differ­
ent meanings to work, and place different demands on their unions.4
O f course, management in any firm faces some diversity among workers in 
terms of their culture and attitudes toward work. Some workers are most 
concerned about their pensions, whereas others may be most concerned about 
their current income and pay little attention to deferred compensation. Some 
workers have strong work ethics and would like to work on their own, 
whereas others may need constant supervision. The extent of this cultural
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diversity widens, however, as the firm crosses national boundaries. As a result, 
for example, compensation policies that work in one country may be inap­
propriate in another. Or communication and motivation techniques that suc­
ceed in one culture will fail in another.
There is also wide diversity in the legal regulation of labor relations and 
employment conditions and the institutions that shape labor relations across 
countries (see chapter 3). In some countries, for example, national laws recog­
nize workers’ rights to form unions and strike, but in other countries unions 
are outlawed or are dominated by the government. In some countries, the 
national government extensively regulates the substance of employment con­
ditions. The ideologies and forms of the labor movement also differ markedly 
across countries (see chapter 2). The structure of unions also differs markedly 
across countries (see examples in chapter 6).
The Degree of Labor Relations Centralization in 
Multinational Corporations
The multinational corporation faces control and coordination problems as a 
result of the wide diversity that exists across countries in culture, law, and 
institutions. The key decision for management that emerges from the diverse 
political and social institutions it faces in different countries is how much to 
centralize the direction of labor relations. At one extreme, labor relations 
management can be centralized in the corporate offices of the MNC. Alterna­
tively, local management in each country in which the MNC operates can be 
allowed to independently direct labor relations. Management’s problem is 
how to pursue companywide objectives through labor relations policies in the 
face of all the diversity that arises in the MNC.
Traditionally, MNCs have responded to this problem by maintaining a 
high degree of local control (decentralization) of labor relations. Analysts, in 
fact, generally conclude that the administration of labor relations of MNCs is 
more decentralized than other management functions, such as finance or 
marketing.5
MNCs found that there were substantial benefits to be gained from the 
decentralization of labor relations, including the ability to respond flexibly to 
the diversity discussed above. When local managers in each country where an 
MNC operates are allowed to shape labor relations pohcies, they can create 
policies and procedures that fit with local conditions and events.
In recent years, however, MNCs have begun to centralize their control 
and administration of labor relations. Centralization of a corporate function 
has always had the advantage of providing consistency and economies of scale. 
However, in the past, the great diversity of many local environments has 
made it difficult to implement consistent policies.
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Why, then, the switch to more centralized control? The explanation ap­
pears to lie in the fact that MNCs are becoming more global in their strategies 
and organizational form. The emergence of global firms has led management 
to strive to integrate their internal operations and policies. When production 
is integrated, for example across national boundaries, it makes less sense for 
the MNC to maintain wide variations in its labor relations policies. The 
opening of trade through mechanisms such as the European Union and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement and the formation of other regional 
trading blocs has contributed to globalization and provides further impetus to 
M NC’s to coordinate labor practices across their global supply chains.
This trend provides another illustration of one of the central themes of this 
book—namely, that managements are increasingly striving to link labor rela­
tions more closely to business strategies. Increased globalization further en­
courages MNCs to develop particular business strategies and then ahgn their 
production and labor relations systems with those business strategies. This is 
not very different from the factors encouraging greater centralization in do­
mestic firms. The special dilemma for labor relations managers in MNCs, 
however, is that culture, law, and institutions in many countries around the 
world shape labor relations at the same time that globalization has increased 
the premium on coordination and centralization.
The literature on human resources at MNCs also provides evidence of how 
national institutions (i.e., laws and public policies) constrain the influence and 
spread of MNC practices; corporations find that they must conform to na­
tional and in some cases local institutional constraints and/or pressures. Some 
of the literature suggests that instead of MNCs bringing standardization in 
workplace practices across countries, it is MNCs that have to bend and mod­
ify their practices to fit institutional constraints and pressures. There is evi­
dence that the intersection of MNC and country-specific institutions leads to 
“hybridization”—practices and forms of organization that are a blend of the 
practices of the home country of the MNC and the practices common in the 
country where the MNC operates. At the same time, studies of the labor rela­
tions practices of MNCs consistently reveal a strong effect from the MNC’s 
country of origin.6
The Globalization of Labor Relations and 
Human Resource Management: The Case of 
Colgate-Palmolive Corporation
Colgate-Palmolive (C-P) is an American-based multinational consumer prod­
ucts firm that has over 100 manufacturing facilities in thirty different coun­
tries. It offers a good case study of how a large MNC has restructured its 
global labor relations activities in recent years.7
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The sales and financial performance of C-P has been quite strong over 
the last ten years, and a key to their success is that the company, which his­
torically had been more global in orientation than its competitors, has become 
even more globally focused. International sales now account for most of the 
company’s profits. In addition, the company has promoted a greater regional 
focus in its manufacturing and marketing operations, in part due to the re­
gional trade pacts that have been reached in recent years and other pacts that 
are expected in the near future in regions including Latin America and Asia.
Regional trade pacts have helped spur a movement toward regional “cen­
ters of excellence” through manufacturing consolidation, and the company 
has moved away from its practice of having more than one plant within a re­
gion (and, in some cases, within a country) produce the same product. Manu­
facturing consolidation was also facilitated by technological improvements 
that made it possible to produce greater volumes in a single plant and organi­
zational (and labor relations) changes that allowed for three-shift-a-day, 
seven-day-a-week production.
There was also a move toward a more simplified global supply chain (i.e., 
more global sourcing and fewer preferred suppliers) and less product variety 
across countries (less “tinkering” with the product). C-P has moved toward 
more globally similar products to take advantage of economies of scale in pro­
duction and standardization of marketing. In addition, the ease with which 
consumer information now moves across countries is leading C-P to seek 
greater central control of marketing and products. These trends are all leading 
to greater regional and global coordination in the M NC’s internal staff 
operations.
An increasingly global focus and structure first appeared in the internal 
functioning of C-P’s human resource management and labor relations. In 
C-P’s plants outside the United States, there is no clear separation between 
“labor relations” and “human resource management.” (This is also true for 
other MNCs.)
C-P’s human relations and labor relations decision making traditionally 
has been decentralized; most decisions were made by facility managers or 
factory managers in facilities. Inside the company, there were country- 
level presidents and directors of manufacturing who became involved in 
facility issues only when there was a crisis in the corporation’s traditional 
way of operating. In addition, there was a small corporate staff (a vice-presi­
dent of human relations and a vice-president of labor relations) in the United 
States at the company’s corporate headquarters in New York City that pro­
vided strategic guidance to country- and facility-level managers on labor rela­
tions and human resource matters. But often these corporate managers did
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not become involved in plant-level labor relations matters until a new labor 
agreement was being negotiated (and even then their input was only advisory) 
or when a strike or some other emergency was occurring. On an everyday 
basis, local managers controlled the labor relations function.
C-P’s corporate managers decided that there was a need to move away 
from this extreme form of decentralization of labor relations because of the 
corporation’s increased need for coordination in the context of the increasing 
role of the company’s global supply chain. In addition, the integration of 
trade and the creation of several new “centers of excellence” in the late 1990s 
led to a consolidation of the company’s production system that was accom­
plished by closing a number of facilities and increasing output flows through 
increased mechanization and full-day and full-week operations in the plants 
that remained. One consequence of production consolidation and increased 
trade flows was that a labor disruption at a center of excellence would pro­
duce greater harm for the company’s sales and profits than had been the case 
in the past. Corporate managers wanted to have more control of these disrup­
tive events and engage regional human resource and labor relations managers 
in efforts to minimize their occurrence altogether and minimize the effects of 
the disruptions that did occur.
A mix of union and nonunion plants had evolved at C-P, and much of the 
corporation’s growth occurred in nonunion plants. Consolidation has been 
occurring disproportionately in unionized facilities in recent years, in part 
because unionized plants also tend to be older plants.
In an effort to achieve more coordination and consistency across the cor­
poration and greater interaction between human resources and labor relations 
managers and those involved in operations, C-P created (or expanded) re­
gional human resource offices and gave them more direct involvement in 
plant-level labor relations activities. To improve the quality of human re­
source and labor relations inside C-P, a series of regional workshops were 
launched that involved the company’s top manufacturing and human resource 
and labor relations staff. The goals of these workshops were to (1) increase the 
regional focus across the company’s operations; (2) increase coordination be­
tween the manufacturing and human resource (and labor relations) staff inside 
the company (these groups had rarely met together in focused meetings in the 
past); and (3) teach a standard and strategic approach to setting key work rule 
and operations objectives in all (unionized and nonunion) facihties. Subse­
quently, related training programs were launched to help C-P managers ac­
quire a more global perspective.
Middle and shop-floor managers at C-P are now expected to convey 
the company’s labor relations goals and the methods that can be used to
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implement its global human resource and labor relations objectives. This 
is accompanied by workforce training programs that focus on instilling an 
appreciation for the increased need to make adaptive changes in the 
workplace.
The various business units in C-P are now required to use a standardized 
“strategic labor relations process” to guide the preparation for, process of, and 
evaluation of collective negotiations (in unionized settings) and employee re­
lations objectives (in facilities where employees are not represented by 
unions). The process includes a country-level planning meeting to set labor 
relations objectives; submission of those objectives for division approval; a 
strategically oriented negotiations process accompanied by an appropriate 
communications strategy; and subsequent evaluation of the overall process. 
Both bargaining objectives (which typically involve work rules and work 
processes) and compensation objectives are identified and then the parties are 
expected to consider how those objectives support one another. This process 
takes place with the guidance of a corporate global labor relations strategy 
developed by top manufacturing and human resource managers. A key out­
come of this process is that various human resource performance metrics are 
now collected and compared across plants. The hope is that this data and the 
ensuing comparisons of plant performance will influence the objectives that 
are set in the strategic labor relations process that guides labor negotiations or 
the formation of employee relations objectives.
Additional steps have been taken in other parts of C-P’s human resource 
and labor relations internal function to stimulate more regionally and globally 
coordinated operations. For example, the company introduced software to 
handle employee personnel records that enables employees to easily access 
their records so they can monitor and make changes in their personnel profile 
(e.g., when their family status changes because of events such as marriage or 
the birth of a child). The corporation also introduced shared information ser­
vices that included centralized call centers to handle employee requests. This 
move was facilitated by the fact that there was increasing similarity in the na­
ture of the business and technologies in the company’s various business units, 
spurred in large part by the increased role of the company’s global supply 
chain.
At C-P’s central corporate, country, and plant levels, increased attention is 
now paid to working conditions throughout the company’s global supply 
chain. The company conducts a regular audit of labor practices at all of its 
supplier plants and the plants it directly operates that includes the monitoring 
of pay levels and work time and efforts to eliminate any child labor. In this 
respect, C-P is addressing issues that have received considerable attention in
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relation to other MNCs. We will take these issues up in a later section of this 
chapter.
Impacts on the Middle Tier of Labor 
Relations Processes
The processes taking place at Colgate-Palmolive illustrate how one large or­
ganization is adjusting to globalization. For all organizations, globalization is 
raising questions and issues related to the functional level of labor relations as 
it is managed across global suppliers and contractors of multinational firms. 
These questions include:
• Which employer is responsible for labor practices in global supply 
operations? Is it the MNC or the local supplier? More generally, should 
an MNC have an explicit global labor strategy and set of principles, and 
if so what should these be and how should they be monitored and 
enforced?
• What standards should govern practices given that there is great 
variation in content; the level at which standards are set for issues such 
as minimum wages, overtime, child labor regulations; and the quality of 
enforcement of labor and employment laws in emerging countries?
• Who, if anyone, represents workers in global supply chains? Unions are 
largely organized at the country level and have not expanded to serve 
workers across national boundaries. In addition, the level of 
unionization, as noted in chapter 6, is very low in many emerging 
countries.
• What are the consequences of globalization on labor relations outcomes? 
Is it inevitable that globalization results in, as Commons predicted, a 
“race to the bottom” that lowers the standards of living in higher-wage 
countries and holds down wages and working conditions in low-wage 
countries or does globalization support economic development and 
improved employment outcomes in emerging nations?
MANAGING A GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN AND 
LABOR PRACTICE POLICIES
Consider Nike’s history in dealing with these key questions. Initially, Nike, 
like many other MNCs, argued that the labor practices of its global suppliers 
were not its responsibility. As worker activists brought media attention to 
abuses of child labor and unsafe working conditions, pressures mounted 
on Nike to question and ultimately to revise its view. In the mid-1990s, 
Nike company leaders noted that there was a direct correlation between the
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growing number of media accounts of poor labor practices and conditions in 
its supply chain and the company’s falling stock price. In 1998, Nike’s CEO 
Phil Knight famously said he was tired of the fact that “Nike’s products have 
become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime, and arbitrary abuse.”8 
Nike changed its policies and practices and became an early leader in estab­
lishing corporate standards for its supply change. It established an internal 
Corporate Social Responsibility Unit and charged it with creating a code of 
conduct that would be used to monitor and evaluate the extent to which its 
suppliers are meeting the standards in its code of conduct. Eventually the 
company made public the locations where its products are made. Box 11.2 
reproduces Nike’s Code of Conduct. Other large MNCs have followed a 
similar path. Unfortunately, too often it has taken a tragic accident to moti­
vate companies to do so. Apple’s largest manufacturer in China, Foxconn, 
experienced suicides and considerable unrest in its factories before Apple be­
gan to actively monitor and seek to improve operations in its supply chain. 
The most visible and largest tragedy to date occurred in the collapse of an ap­
parel factory in Bangladesh in 2013 (discussed in box 9.3).
BOX 11.2
Nike’s Code o f Conduct
Employment is voluntary
• The contractor does not use forced labor, including prison 
labor, indentured labor, bonded labor or other forms of forced 
labor. The contractor is responsible for employment eligibility 
fees of foreign workers, including recruitment fees.
Employees are age 16 or older
• Contractor’s employees are at least age 16 or over the age for 
completion of compulsory education or country legal working 
age, whichever is higher. Employees under 18 are not 
employed in hazardous conditions.
Contractor does not discriminate
• Contractor’s employees are not subject to discrimination in 
employment, including hiring, compensation, promotion or 
discipline, on the basis of gender, race, religion, age, disability,
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sexual orientation, pregnancy, marital status, nationality, 
political opinion, trade union affiliation, social or ethnic origin 
or any other status protected by country law.
Freedom of association and collective bargaining are respected
• To the extent permitted by the laws of the manufacturing 
country, the contractor respects the right of its employees to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining. This includes 
the right to form and join trade unions and other worker 
organizations of their own choosing without harassment, 
interference or retaliation.
Compensation is timely paid
• Contractor’s employees are timely paid at least the minimum 
wage required by country law and provided legally mandated 
benefits, including holidays and leaves, and statutory severance 
when employment ends. There are no disciplinary deductions 
from pay.
Harassment and abuse are not tolerated
• Contractor’s employees are treated with respect and dignity. 
Employees are not subject to physical, sexual, psychological or 
verbal harassment or abuse.
Working hours are not excessive
• Contractor’s employees do not work in excess of 60 hours per 
week, or the regular and overtime hours allowed by the laws of 
the manufacturing country, whichever is less. Any overtime 
hours are consensual and compensated at a premium rate. 
Employees are allowed at least 24 consecutive hours rest in 
every seven-day period.
Regular employment is provided
• Work is performed on the basis of a recognized employment 
relationship established through country law and practice. The 
contractor does not use any form of home-working 
arrangement for the production of Nike-branded or affiliate 
product.
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The workplace is healthy and safe
• The contractor provides a safe, hygienic and healthy workplace 
setting and takes necessary steps to prevent accidents and injury 
arising out of, linked with or occurring in the course of work 
or as a result of the operation of contractor’s facilities. The 
contractor has systems to detect, avoid and respond to potential 
risks to the safety and health of all employees.
Environmental impact is minimized
• The contractor protects human health and the environment by 
meeting applicable regulatory requirements including air 
emissions, solid/hazardous waste and water discharge. The 
contractor adopts reasonable measures to mitigate negative 
operational impacts on the environment and strives to 
continuously improve environmental performance.
The code is fully implemented
• As a condition of doing business with Nike, the contractor 
shall implement and integrate this Code and accompanying 
Code Leadership Standards and applicable laws into its business 
and submit to verification and monitoring. The contractor shall 
post this Code, in the language(s) of its employees, in all major 
workspaces, train employees on their rights and obligations as 
defined by this Code and applicable country law; and ensure 
the compliance of any sub-contractors producing Nike branded 
or affiliate products.
Sources: http://www.nikeinc.com/system/assets/2806/Nike_Code_oCConduct 
_original.pdf. See also Nike’s Corporate Responsibility Report at http://w w w  
. nikebiz. com/ erreport/.
Monitoring Compliance with Codes of Conduct
Once a company creates a code of conduct, it must decide how to monitor 
and enforce it. Should the company do this itself, using audit teams staffed by 
members of the company’s social responsibility units? Should it hire and pay 
consultants to audit its labor practices? Should it work with and allow NGOs 
to do the auditing? Should it audit operations on an unannounced basis or tell
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suppliers in advance when audits will be done? Should it coordinate its own 
audits with the audits of other MNCs that purchase goods from a given sup­
plier to avoid having multiple firms using different standards and engaging 
in auditing operations at different times? And finally, what standards should 
apply—ones that are consistent with the host country’s laws, norms, and 
competitive wage rates or companywide standards?
Some MNCs, such as Walmart, have sought to avoid working with NGOs 
and instead have hired consultants and professional engineering firms to mon­
itor suppliers. Others use a combination of internal auditors, consultants, and 
NGOs. Still others work together and with global labor organizations to per­
form auditing and training functions. We will discuss the roles NGOs play in 
these processes in more detail later in this chapter.
The effectiveness of corporate audits is one of the most hotly debated issues 
in the field of labor relations today. The results of the best research on this 
topic indicate that when rates are arrayed on a scale of 0 to 100 percent com­
pliance with the standards in corporate codes of conduct, the average rate 
tends to peak slightly above 50 percent. Moreover, few plants appear to be 
on a path of continuous improvement toward 100 percent compliance. In­
stead, over time some plants experience declines in compliance scores and 
improvements.
Some plants do better than others on a consistent basis. Plants located in 
countries with strong laws governing labor and other business practices tend 
to have higher compliance scores. So do plants that have longer-term con­
tracts with MNCs and plants where there is more management interaction 
and sharing of expertise on best practices in lean manufacturing and advanced 
HRM systems.9 However, the fact that periodic inspections of building safety 
do not ensure that workplaces are truly safe is well illustrated by the examples 
provided in a New York Times account of the steps managers at numerous gar­
ment factories took to avoid and manipulate the inspection/audit process (see 
box 11.3).
BOX 11.3
Fast and Flawed Inspections o f Factories Abroad
Inspectors came and went from a Walmart-certified factory in Guang­
dong Province in China, approving its production of more than $2 mil­
lion in specialty items that would land on Walmart’s shelves in time for 
Christmas.
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But unknown to the inspectors, none of the playful items, including 
reindeer suits and Mrs. Claus dresses for dogs, that were supplied to 
Walmart had been manufactured at the factory. Instead, Chinese work­
ers sewed the goods—which had been ordered by the Quaker Pet 
Group, a company based in New Jersey—at a rogue factory that had not 
gone through the certification process set by Walmart for labor, worker 
safety or quality, according to documents and interviews with officials 
involved.
To receive approval for shipment to Walmart, a Quaker subcontrac­
tor just moved the items over to the approved factory, where they were 
presented to inspectors as though they had been stitched together there 
and never left the premises.
Soon after the merchandise reached Walmart stores, it began falling 
apart.
Fifteen hundred miles to the west, the Rosita Knitwear factory in 
northwestern Bangladesh—which made sweaters for companies across 
Europe—passed an inspection audit with high grades. A team of four 
monitors gave the factory hundreds of approving check marks. In all 12 
major categories, including working hours, compensation, management 
practices and health and safety, the factory received the top grade of 
“good.” “Working Conditions—No complaints from the workers,” the 
auditors wrote.
In February 2012, 10 months after that inspection, Rosita’s workers 
rampaged through the factory, vandalizing its machinery and accusing 
management of reneging on promised raises, bonuses and overtime pay. 
Some claimed that they had been sexually harassed or beaten by guards. 
Not a hint of those grievances was reported in the audit. . . .
An extensive examination by The New York Times reveals how the 
inspection system intended to protect workers and ensure manufactur­
ing quality is riddled with flaws. The inspections are often so superficial 
that they omit the most fundamental workplace safeguards like fire es­
capes. And even when inspectors are tough, factory managers find ways 
to trick them and hide serious violations, like child labor or locked exit 
doors. Dangerous conditions cited in the audits frequently take months 
to correct, often with little enforcement or follow-through to guarantee 
compliance.
Supply chain experts and monitors say that far too often, factory man­
agers play cat-and-mouse games with inspectors because they are desper­
ate to avoid a failing grade and the loss of a lucrative stream of orders.
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The experts provided real-life examples. To avoid appearing illegally 
overcrowded, one factory moved many machines into trucks parked 
outside during an inspection, a monitor said. Whenever inspectors 
showed up at certain plants in China, the loudspeakers began playing a 
certain song to signal that underage workers should run out the back 
door, according to several monitors. During inspections in India, some 
factories displayed elaborate charts detailing health and safety proce­
dures that, like stage props, were transferred from one factory to an­
other, another monitor said. . . .
Mr. [Auret] van Heerden [president of the Fair Labor Association] 
said, “You can never visit facilities often enough to make sure they stay 
compliant—you’ll never have enough inspectors to do that. What really 
keeps factories compliant is when workers have a voice and they can 
speak out when something isn’t right.”
Source: Reprinted from Stephanie Clifford and Steven Greenhouse, “Fast and 
Flawed Inspections of Factories Abroad,” New York Times, September 3, 2013.
The evidence on the positive but limited effects of corporate codes of con­
duct has led to active debates about what else needs to be done to improve 
labor conditions in global supply chains.10 Meetings of the multiple stakehold­
ers involved—MNCs, NGOs, unions, government officials, ILO representa­
tives, and academics—have been held at various universities to seek consensus 
on how to improve monitoring and compliance with codes of conduct, but 
to date no clear consensus has emerged. One big problem that remains is 
that a root cause of the pressure to violate labor standards comes from the 
purchasing and sourcing staff of MNCs. Pressure to deliver products that have 
short life cycles (e.g., a particularly popular style of shirts or shoes or the 
newest iPad or similar electronic device) quickly reverberates down through 
the supply chain to contractors, who conclude that they have no choice 
but to pressure their work force to meet the schedule. Not surprisingly, viola­
tions of hours rules—forced overtime, long hours, shorter meal and rest 
breaks, and fewer days off—are among the most frequent violations of codes 
of conduct.
INTERNATIONAL (FREE) TRADE AGREEMENTS
Increased international trade also has been spurred in recent years through 
various regional and international trade agreements. Our review of several of
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those agreements in this section focuses on the concerns about labor rights 
and labor conditions that surfaced during debates about these agreements and 
the provisions that were included in them to address those concerns. We fo­
cus on the three trade agreements the United States made with Canada and 
Mexico, Jordan, and Colombia.
NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) linking Can­
ada, the United States, and Mexico, which took effect in January 1994, re­
moved tariffs and other trade barriers among the three countries over a 
fifteen-year period. Both the passage and the continuing effects of NAFTA 
have been extremely controversial. NAFTA has been widely criticized by la­
bor unions, who claim that Mexico’s low wages have enticed many U.S. 
firms to relocate south of the border. Meanwhile, environmentalists worry 
that companies flee south in order to take advantage of weak pollution con­
trols and lax enforcement of environmental regulations. Presidents Clinton, 
Bush, and Obama; the U.S. business community; and many economists, on 
the other side of this debate, support NAFTA on grounds that it provides 
gains to all three countries through trade. NAFTA supporters also claim that 
it will help integrate Mexico more fully into the world economy and thereby 
address Mexico’s social problems and their spillover effects in the United 
States (such as high immigration and the drug trade). To address its critics, 
side agreements were added to NAFTA concerning the environment and la­
bor rights. The side agreements related to labor created national administra­
tive offices that are authorized to investigate public charges that one of the 
NAFTA countries is not enforcing its own labor laws.
The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
In the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement of 2001, both countries made 
pledges related to “reducing barriers for services, providing cutting-edge 
protection for intellectual property, ensuring regulatory transparency, and 
requiring effective labor and environmental enforcement.”11 The effects 
of this treaty in Jordan were significant. American companies such as 
Walmart and Target quickly established stores in Jordan, and in the first year 
after the trade agreement was agreed, Jordan increased its exports by 213 
percent.
The U.S.-Jordan agreement was the first free trade agreement between the 
United States and a foreign country that directly included labor provisions in 
the text of the agreement itself. In the agreement, both countries agreed to
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comply with the statutes embodied in the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and to enforce their own domestic labor laws.12 
Moreover, the free trade agreement established dispute resolution procedures 
and trade sanctions to be used if either country was seen as violating its do­
mestic labor laws.
However, although these provisions were hailed by the labor and environ­
mentalist communities, the U.S. government’s policy with regard to enforc­
ing the labor provisions of the agreement became much more pro-business 
when George W. Bush became president. In 2001, newly installed U.S. trade 
representative Robert Zoellick and the Jordanian ambassador to the United 
States announced that both the United States and Jordan had agreed not to 
resort to trade sanctions and that neither country would use the dispute reso­
lution enforcement procedures outlined in the free trade agreement if they 
would block trade. Consequently, the labor provisions that had been hailed as 
revolutionary in this agreement were not implemented.13 In addition, after 
the implementation of the free trade agreement in 2001, Jordan passed a Pub­
lic Assembly Law and other legislation that limited freedom of association and 
collective negotiations.
In 2006, the National Labor Committee (an NGO) testified to the U.S. 
Congress that labor laws were not being enforced in Jordan and provided evi­
dence that the Jordanian garment industry had sweatshops where workers 
worked 20-hour days, were not paid consistently, and suffered emotional and 
physical abuse. These companies employed migrant workers from China, Sri 
Lanka, and Bangladesh who were being forced to work as de facto involun­
tary servants.
The U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement
The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement came into force in May 
2012.14 The agreement states that both the United States and Colombia will 
continue to maintain in domestic law the right to freedom of association (the 
right to form and join a union) and the right to engage in collective negotia­
tions and will fulfill promises that all forms of forced and child labor will be 
eliminated.
Observers claim that, as in Jordan and Mexico, the labor rights provisions 
in the Colombia trade pact have proven to be ineffective. Allegations surfaced 
that since 2010, 104 labor and human rights activists have been murdered in 
Colombia. Furthermore, the Congressional Monitoring Group on Labor 
Rights provided extensive documentation showing that the right to organize 
and engage in collective negotiations was being curtailed and undermined in 
Colombia.15
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The Controversy Surrounding Trade Agreements
These three trade agreements make clear that a great deal of controversy exists 
about the real impacts of trade agreements on worker rights and work condi­
tions. Defenders of these agreements argue that higher levels of trade ulti­
mately lead to higher rates of economic growth in emerging countries and 
improvements, even if they are gradual, in wages and work conditions. Crit­
ics, on the other hand, claim that trade pacts encourage MNCs to leave coun­
tries where wages and work conditions are better. And these critics allege that 
even in the emerging countries, any growth in employment largely occurs in 
low-wage sectors, often at the expense of already existing indigenous (and 
frequently more craft-oriented) production.
LABOR RESPONSES TO THE 
POWER ADVANTAGE OP 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
The expansion of economic activity across national boundaries creates a dis­
advantage in bargaining power for workers and unions. Multinational opera­
tion allows management to move production and capital across national 
borders and increases the competition for jobs among workers. Imagine, for 
example, the pressures highly paid Western European (or North American) 
workers experience when MNCs operating in their countries can shift pro­
duction to countries where workers receive hourly wages that are a fraction 
of those received in Western countries and where environmental and other 
social regulations are weaker. This is what unionists refer to as “social dump­
ing.” When management faces a strike in its operations in one country, it can 
gain leverage during the bargaining process if it can turn to alternative pro­
duction facilities in other countries or substitute workers in other countries 
for those who are out on strike.
In theory, one way a union could counter the advantages management 
gains from the expansion of markets is to expand the union’s jurisdiction so 
that it is coextensive with the boundaries of the multinational. This is how 
unions in the United States and a number of other advanced industrialized 
countries expanded their jurisdiction. They shifted from local or regional 
unions to become national unions as the product markets the companies they 
worked for grew national in scope. If this were accomplished, the resulting 
multinational unions would be better able to remove competition across 
workers in the different locations where the MNC operates. How successful 
have unions been at following a similar strategy and becoming multinational? 
This section examines that issue.
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Even though there are some examples of multinational unions or at least 
policies to coordinate national unions, these examples are few. Let us consider 
why this has been so and then look at some counterexamples.
Union Difficulties with Operating 
at the Multinational Level
Unions have found it difficult to become multinational because of the wide 
diversity that exists across countries in culture, law, and institutions. It is dif­
ficult enough for a union operating in one country to maintain cohesion and 
solidarity among its members. When the economic and cultural differences, 
communication difficulties, and fears that exist among workers in different 
countries are added to the normal problems of unions, maintaining solidarity 
becomes a nearly insurmountable problem.
Consider the problems that multinational operation creates for union soli­
darity in both emerging and highly industrialized countries. Workers in an 
emerging country, who earn low wages and face few employment alterna­
tives, are generally very reluctant to support the bargaining demands of their 
high-wage counterparts in an advanced industrialized nation. There are strong 
short-run incentives for the workers in these two countries to view each 
other as competitors.
Imagine how difficult it is for a union to communicate with its members if 
those members speak a variety of languages. In addition, the managers in an 
MNC typically have a lot of information about company objectives and 
worldwide activities, whereas workers and unions are often hard pressed to 
gain information about such activities.
Mergers of independent unions across national borders has not been a solu­
tion to multinational pressures. Merging independent unions is difficult 
enough even in a single country where there are strong bargaining power 
advantages to be gained. Even greater impediments exist for such a merger if 
it were to involve two unions based in different countries that represent 
workers at the same MNC.
It is quite likely that the structure of two unions that might consider merg­
ing would not be similar even if the workers were employed by the same 
firm. Similar problems would exist even if these unions were to merely work 
to coordinate their bargaining demands.
Yet even given these difficulties, examples of cross-national union solidar­
ity and support can occur short of mergers or coordinated bargaining. We 
examine efforts to build cross-national union solidarity below.
Cross-border union strategies have taken many different forms. The strate­
gies are different for a Thai garment worker or a German metalworker or a
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U.S. retail worker. Industry, company, union structure, political traditions, 
ideology, levels of bargaining power, and differing sets of goals all affect how 
cross-border union activities are structured.
The Role of International Trade Secretariats
A number of international trade secretariats exist that provide informa­
tion to member unions and coordinate activities across national borders. 
These are autonomous agencies that cover particular industries or groups of 
industries. The International Metalworkers Federation, one of the most active 
of these secretariats, includes members from many emerging countries and 
highly industrialized nations. Among its many activities, it issues research re­
ports to its members.
Many of the secretariats have a close working relationship with the Interna­
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which includes affili­
ated unions that represent 48 million workers around the world. The ICFTU 
includes only non-communist unions. The World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU) at one time represented 134 million workers in the Com­
munist unions that were affiliated with it. While the expansion of global trade 
is leading unions around the world to communicate more extensively with 
unions in other countries, the political differences that have traditionally sepa­
rated these federations and many of their member unions have impeded coor­
dination among these and other union federations.
Cross-Border Union Alliances
A number of unions have attempted to overcome these communications and 
political differences and have extended their reach around the world, either 
on their own or by forming alliances across national unions. Airline pilots 
have the most fully established international body. It is composed of 100 na­
tional-level pilots’ unions/associations and has a combined membership of 
approximately 100,000 pilots (see box 11.4).
BOX 11.4
The International Federation o f Airline 
Pilots Associations (IFALPA)
The mission of IFALPA is to be the global voice of professional pilots by 
providing representation, services and support in order to promote the 
highest level of aviation safety worldwide.
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This goal is realized through our core function which is to represent 
our members by:
Interacting with international organizations to achieve the highest 
level of aviation safety.
Developing common policies and positions and promoting the 
adoption of such policies by ICAO, regulatory authorities and the 
State of each Member Association.
Promoting and enhancing the role and status of professional pilots in 
ensuring the safety of the aircraft and well being of passengers and 
goods entrusted to their care.
Promoting a viable and expanding air transport industry.
Providing training and education for the benefit of professional 
pilots.
Providing Member Associations with services as needed.
Assisting in the organisational development of Member 
Associations.
Supporting Member Associations by providing expertise in the areas 
of Technical, Safety, Regulation and Industrial issues.
Facilitating the exchange of information and the co-ordination of 
activities amongst Member Associations and Pilot Alliances 
through various forums such as Conferences, Regional Meetings 
and Standing Committees.
Source: International Federation of Airline Pilots’ Association, http://www 
.ifalpa.org/, accessed Nov. 15, 2013.
Cross-National Union Strategies and 
Pressure Campaigns
Similar cross-border networks or formal agreements to coordinate when 
needed in order to offset the power of MNCs have occurred in other 
industries as well. One prominent example was formed in 2008 that in­
volved the United Steelworkers (based in North America) and UNITE 
(based in the United Kingdom). Box 11.5 summarizes the goals of their joint 
effort, called Workers Uniting. To date, these unions have supported each 
other in strikes involving companies that have operations in Britain and North 
America.
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BOX 11.5
Workers Uniting—the Global Union
Workers Uniting brings together Unite, the biggest union in the UK 
and Ireland, with the United Steelworkers, the largest industrial union 
in North America. Here are four reasons why this partnership is 
critical.
1. The economy is globalizing. From Brussels to Beijing, decisions 
about our economy are increasingly made far from home. A 
global union can provide us a voice in those decisions.
2. Politics is globalizing. Right wing politicians are using the same 
vicious tactics to undermine our livelihoods in the UK as they 
are in the U.S. and Canada. A global union can help us support 
progressive politics on both sides of the Atlantic.
3. Our employers are globalizing. A couple decades ago, only a few 
of our employers operated in more than one country. Now, 
nearly all of them do. A global union can help us stand up to our 
employers wherever they operate.
4. The movement is globalizing. Whether it’s standing up for fair 
trade or fighting back against bank bailouts, progressive groups 
are mobilizing and uniting everywhere. A global union can help 
us join them in the fight for a better world.
Source: http://www.workersuniting.org/, accessed Nov. 15, 2013.
Comprehensive Union Pressure Campaigns
Unions have developed comprehensive or strategic campaigns in recent years 
that use a combination of research, rank-and-file activism, boycotts, and po­
litical leverage to bring pressure to bear on a company globally. These cam­
paigns often target a single employer where workers have gone on strike, 
have been locked out, or are engaged in an organizing drive. They use in- 
depth research to identify vulnerabilities in a company’s global operations. 
Comprehensive union campaigns build coalitions with communities, NGOs, 
and other unions around the world to target the company’s image, its suppli­
ers, or its customers globally and to pressure the company to improve labor 
conditions.
The 1986 Shell Oil boycott was one of the earliest truly global comprehen­
sive campaigns. Using the consumer boycott as its central tactic, the campaign
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against Shell linked anti-apartheid activists, trade unionists, civil rights activ­
ists, pohticians, church activists, and consumers in a global divestment cam­
paign. The United Steelworkers in North America have used these types of 
campaigns extensively to pressure global multinational companies such as 
BASF, Ravenswood, Bridgestone/Firestone, and Goodyear to end strikes and 
lockouts and to support collective negotiations campaigns. This approach is 
not limited to North American unions. Central American banana workers, 
European dockworkers, and Taiwanese telecommunications workers have all 
used cross-border campaigns in recent years.
However, while many campaigns have been successful, this type of global 
coordination and comprehensive campaigning requires large amounts of re­
sources, funding, and long-term trust between unions. Companies have 
threatened unions with lawsuits for engaging in these types of campaigns, and 
weak transnational labor standards have made it difficult for unions to enforce 
gains that have been made.
Cross-Border Union Networks
Union networks are groups of unions at a shared multinational employer that 
come together to create a transnational structure for the purpose of sharing 
information, coordinating activity, and bargaining with an employer on a 
transnational level. Networks first appeared in the 1970s and have been pro­
moted by global union federations (GUFs) as a way for unions to overcome 
the imbalance in bargaining power that unions of workers for multinational 
employers experience. Networks create long-term relationships between 
unions that have enabled unions to share information about a common em­
ployer, to act as infrastructure during cross-border campaigns, and to act as 
decision-making bodies that can bargain with employers on a transnational 
level.
Dozens of networks have been established in the auto, chemicals, food, and 
service industries. Networks of unions of employees at companies such as 
Carrefour and Arcelor have been able to sign agreements with employers on 
a transnational level such as international framework agreements (IFAs) that 
establish basic health and safety conditions and independent monitoring. 
Companies such as Volkswagen and Mercedes have created European-style 
works councils that meet annually with company management to discuss 
working conditions and compliance with basic ILO conventions. Finally, 
unions of employees at companies such as Gerdau and Sodexo have used net­
works as infrastructure during global campaigns. Unions in Brazil in particular 
have used networking as a strategy to coordinate bargaining nationally and 
establish transnational links with unions in the company’s home country.
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However, challenges remain. National differences with regard to labor 
laws, language and communication issues, and weak transnational legal 
regulations have hampered attempts to build long-term union network 
structures.
Sweatshop/Garment/Apparel Campaigns
In the 1970s, sweatshops to produce garments reappeared in Latin America, 
the Caribbean Basin, Southeast Asia, and southern California. At that time, 
nations reeling from debt crises and structural adjustment programs turned to 
export processing zones for growth strategies. These zones are tax-free havens 
where MNCs can assemble low-value products such as garments, textiles, 
electronics, and toys with a low-wage-earning, mainly female workforce. 
Aided by free trade agreements and a system of subcontracting and global 
production, sweatshops became a prevalent source of supply for many high 
fashion apparel lines in the developed world and the embodiment of a race to 
the bottom for emerging countries.
Workers, mainly young women, organizing in countries such as Guate­
mala, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Haiti have used global solidarity campaigns as 
a means of winning improvements in individual garment factories and in­
creasing pressure for industry-wide and retailer-wide codes of conduct. These 
campaigns bring together a broad group of actors, including garment workers 
and unions, transnational NGOs, labor union allies, consumer activists, and 
North American university students.
Two factors are unique to organizing in the apparel industry. First, many of 
the products produced in the apparel factories of Latin American and South 
Asia are sold to consumers in North America and Western Europe. These 
consumers created an opportunity for garment workers to make alliances with 
unions and consumer groups in advanced industrial countries and create pub­
licity about their working conditions. Second, as with the example of Nike 
discussed earlier in this chapter, many factories in emerging countries are ac­
tually subcontractors for large companies that produce well-known brand 
names and are headquartered in advanced industrial countries, such as Benet­
ton, Disney, and Reebok. Because of the disparity between the high cost of 
luxury apparel in advanced industrial countries and the poor conditions of 
workers in emerging countries, garment worker campaigns have often relied 
on publicity that links well-known retailers such as the Gap and Walmart to 
poor working conditions in emerging countries in order to create enough 
consumer pressure to convince the retailers to assist in efforts to improve 
working conditions in garment factories.
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In addition, because many universities have large contracts with athletic 
companies such as Adidas and Nike, U.S. college students have become key 
supporters of these campaigns through groups such as United Students Against 
Sweatshops (USAS).
Some unions have promoted international framework agreements as effec­
tive structures. IFAs are multilateral agreements that are signed between a 
corporation and a union, usually one of the global union federations, in order 
to ensure equal standards across a multinational corporation. IFAs establish 
core labor standards such as the abolition of child labor, nondiscrimination, 
and freedom of association. They attempt to cover all employees, including 
workers who are subcontracted or are employed by subsidiaries and suppliers 
of the firm, and are designed to establish an institutionalized relationship with 
the firm at the headquarters level to ensure some form of monitoring and a 
process for improving working conditions. Even though some unions have 
had some success in getting companies to sign IFAs, these agreements are vol­
untary and are difficult to enforce due to a weak transnational regulatory 
environment.
THE ROLE OF NGOS
NGOs are now playing active roles in identifying abuses, lobbying for im­
proved standards and enforcement practices, and in some cases actively repre­
senting workers and/or auditing labor conditions in suppher operations. Some 
NGOs are funded by employers. Some are funded independently by private 
foundations, individual donations, or labor unions. Some choose to work at 
arm’s length with MNCs, some choose to work in collaboration with MNCs, 
and many implement both of these tactics. Various meetings have been held 
to bring together representatives of NGOs, unions, MNCs, and international 
organizations such as the ILO and the World Bank to try to learn from their 
experiences and about the research being done on global labor standards. But 
diversity of practices remains the norm. (See table 11.1 for examples of differ­
ent NGO activities.)
The Worker Rights Consortium
One of the most active of these NGOs is the Worker Rights Consortium 
(WRC). The W RC has been involved in efforts to improve labor conditions 
at Foxconn, at apparel factories in Bangladesh, and at Nike. The history and 
role of the W RC is described in detail in box 11.6.
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Table 11.1. Examples of labor NGOs and their activities
Name Activities
Fair Labor Association 
(www.fairlabor. org)
Monitors factories independently and reviews company audits
Certifies compliance with codes of conduct
Reports on results of audits in participating companies
Governed by board of industry, NGO, and university representatives
Social Accountability 
International (www 
.sa8000.org)
Certifies that manufacturers are in compliance with SA8000 labor
standards
Trains auditors
Provides self-assessment software for supply chains with 
recommendations for how to improve performance 
Lists factories that have achieved SA8000 certification 
Governed by mix of industry, NGO, and legal specialists
Worker Rights 
Consortium (www 
.workersrights. org)
Investigates conditions in factories that sell licensed apparel to 
universities
Publishes periodic reports on factory conditions in different countries 
Maintains public database of factories supplying to universities 
Governed by board of worker rights advocates consisting of university 
faculty and staff, students, and independent labor rights experts
United Students Against 
Sweatshops (www.usas 
•org)
Campaigns against abuses of workers’ rights in factories that supply 
apparel licensed by universities
Advocates for fair working conditions for university employees 
Led by student representatives from participating universities
China Labor Bulletin 
(www.clb.org.hk/en/)
Provides legal assistance to workers and labor organizations in China 
Conducts research on labor conditions in China
Maintains a Web site that provides information on strikes and collective 
bargaining in China 
Led by professional staff
BOX 11.6
Policing Workers’ Rights in the Global Economy:
The Worker Rights Consortium
The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), a nonprofit organization 
started by the United Students Against Sweatshops in consultation with 
workers and labor rights experts, has become a watchdog for interna­
tional sweatshop labor. The W RC was begun to help enforce the man­
ufacturing codes of conduct adopted by colleges and universities; these 
codes ensure that factories that produce clothing and other goods bear­
ing college and university names respect workers’ rights.
The W RC has pressured universities to end their contracts with 
companies that do not comply with labor standards. For example, in
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March 2000, Brown University terminated its contract with Nike Inc., 
because of Brown’s requirement that Nike comply with the university’s 
licensing requirements and a monitoring system that is part of the WRC 
process. In its defense, Nike said that it had “serious concerns about the 
code and monitoring system included under the W RC” and that “the 
only effective way to make progress in improving factory conditions 
around the world is to have all stakeholders at the table.” Nike claimed 
that the WRC was excluding industries and that it should be working 
with them instead.
The W RC at times has clashed with the Fair Labor Association 
(FLA), an independent group formed by the Clinton administration in 
1999 to monitor the labor standards of overseas apparel manufacturers 
that sell their products to the United States. The FLA grew out of the 
Apparel Industry Partnership, a group of apparel manufacturers, con­
sumer groups, and labor and human rights organizations brought to the 
White House in 1996. By 2000, over 100 colleges and universities had 
associated with the FLA so that they could be assured that clothing with 
their logos was not made in sweatshops. However, the W RC has criti­
cized the FLA for being an industry-controlled monitoring system that 
only covers up sweatshop abuses and claims that only it, the WRC, can 
provide monitoring that is not swayed by corporate pressure.
Recently, however, the W RC and FLA have begun to forge a work­
ing relationship that includes working together on various monitoring 
projects. The W RC’s membership now includes more than 100 col­
leges and universities.
Sources: “Nike Terminates Contract with Brown after University Seeks Com­
pliance with Code,” Daily Labor Report, April 4, 2000, A-2; and “Temple 
University Reviews Membership in ‘Fair Labor’ Apparel Monitoring Group,” 
Daily Labor Report February 22, 2000, A-5.
NEGOTIATING GLOBAL STANDARDS
The challenge of creating negotiations structures and ongoing relationships in 
global operations has generated a number of different approaches. The most 
basic approach is to promote union representation on the shop floors of sup­
plier operations by providing technical assistance to unions in emerging coun­
tries. The ILO is active in providing this type of technical assistance. In 
Cambodia, the ILO has developed a particularly extensive Better Factories
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Cambodia program that provides training, outreach, dispute resolution, and 
monitoring and disseminates information about best practices related to 
unions, collective negotiations, and labor standards. Reports on the program 
are quite positive. Rates of union representation in apparel plants range up to 
50 percent and compliance with the labor standards in the ILO’s code of con­
duct range between 70 and 95 percent. There continue to be reports of col­
lusion and corruption among some employers and union leaders, however. 
This program has been sustained for over a decade in large part because of the 
continued support of the ILO and the Cambodian government. An indepen­
dent evaluation of the ILO program has shown that the garment industry has 
continued to grow in Cambodia since the program was put in place and the 
firms that have complied with the employment standards the program moni­
tors were more likely to survive over time than those that did not.16
While the Cambodian example is encouraging, it has yet to be replicated in 
other emerging countries, where unionization rates remain quite low and main­
taining stable unions in industries and companies has proven to be difficult.
In some ways NGOs are a substitute for traditional unions. They have led 
efforts to publicize abuses of labor standards. They have negotiated with com­
panies to improve working conditions in specific countries. Some have created 
sophisticated software programs that enable firms to evaluate the state of labor 
practices in their supply chains and receive advice about how to improve them. 
Others, such as United Students Against Sweatshops, have used consumer 
boycotts and lawsuits against highly visible brand-name companies such as 
Adidas and Nike to press them to end labor abuses among their contractors.
BOX 11.7
NGOs That Conduct Union-Like Activities
To improve working conditions in a number of countries, NGOs have 
emerged that include the direct negotiation of wages and other im­
provements in working conditions in their activities. Two prominent 
examples are found in India. We present them below as examples of the 
expanding role of NGOs in directly representing and bargaining on 
behalf of low-wage workers around the world.
In India, as in most emerging countries, the activities of a number of 
NGOs include some of the roles unions play in advanced industrial 
countries. One such organization is the internationally acclaimed Self- 
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA). Founded in 1972 by Nobel
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Peace Prize nominee Ela Bhatt, SEWA represents poor self-employed 
w omen m ü\e tot A a i \u .  ü.\\oTga\Yii.eu. ecowoiwic sect-OYS ot \i\uia. These 
women do not earn wages; they earn money through their own labor 
and small businesses. Dr. Bhatt’s main goal for SEWA, which has over 
960,000 members, includes trying to move them out of the informal 
sector, helping them gain full-time work, and improving the compen­
sation and benefits women receive for their work, whether or not that 
work is in the informal sector. Essential facets of SEWA’s activities are 
lobbying state and national governments to increase funding for social 
protection services, including health insurance and child care coverage; 
identifying microlenders; pressuring banks and other financial institu­
tions to lower interest rates for first-time borrowers; and convincing 
financial institutions to provide more credit for women in business.
Another highly significant NGO/union in India is the Kagad Kach 
Patra Kashtakari Panchayat (KKPKP), also known as the Trade Union 
of Waste Pickers. The KKPKP represents waste pickers, waste collec­
tors, and informal recyclers, all of which are part of the unorganized 
rural sector of the Indian economy. A key aspect of the KKPKP’s role, 
like that of SEWA, is politically lobbying. KKPKP lobbies local mu­
nicipalities and state governments to increase grants to the KKPKP’s 
credit cooperative, which offers loans to members and provides a social 
security fund, so waste collectors have retirement funds. The KKPKP 
also helps members negotiate and bargain with local municipalities and 
private firms that hire waste collector workers. In April 2013, the 
KKPKP engaged in a sit-in strike in the city of Pune to protest the low 
wages waste collectors received.
In sum, India has numerous and multifaceted nongovernmental or­
ganizations, some of which perform critical union-like roles. Almost 60 
percent of the Indian labor market consists of rural and informal sector 
workers, and these organizations represent workers in negotiations with 
government agencies and private sector employers. These NGOs help 
promote the emergence of an Indian middle class through advocacy, 
negotiations, protests, and political lobbying.
Sources: “About Us: History,” Self-Employed W omen’s Association,
http://www.sewa.org/About_Us_History.asp; “Initiatives,” Kagad Kach Patra 
Kashtakari Panchayat, http://wastepickerscollective.org/index.php?mod=page 
&id=3; Leslie Vryenhoek, “KKPKP’s Six-Day Protest Wins a Promise from 
Municipality,” Inclusive Cities, April 11, 2013, http://www.inclusivecities 
.org/blog/kkpkps-six-day-protest-wins-a-promise-from-municipality/.
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Summary
This chapter began with Common’s hypothesis that it would be difficult for 
unions to raise and standardize wages unless unions had a scope and jurisdic­
tion that matched the expanding scope of product markets. MNCs have ben­
efited from globalization because they take advantage of the efficiencies gained 
in global supply chains. The internationalization of production also shifts bar­
gaining power in favor of MNCs in a number of ways. To date, no single 
institutional response or alternative source of power has been successful in 
counterbalancing this shift in power. Media exposure has been the most effec­
tive way to pressure MNCs to upgrade standards in their supply chains. How­
ever, this strategy has proven to be episodic. While media reports of tragedies 
or abusive work conditions do create a flurry of corrective activity, they tend 
to lose momentum fairly quickly after media coverage fades.
In general, consumers have not responded in consistent ways or demanded 
data on labor standards or avoided products of companies with reported labor 
standards problems. However, led by students organizing on college campuses 
into branches of USAS, successful consumer campaigns have been mounted 
that require MNCs that sell licensed athletic and sportswear bearing university 
logos to comply with NGO-specified labor standards.
Although codes of conduct have helped improve standards, they cannot, 
on their own, serve as a comprehensive strategy for achieving compliance or 
sustained improvements in labor standards in emerging countries. There is 
evidence that countries with stronger labor laws and enforcement practices 
have, on average, better wages and working conditions. The ILO’s Better 
Factories Cambodia experiment suggests that a heavy infusion of incentives 
(lower tariffs or other trade restrictions), government and international pres­
sures, and support for workplace-based unions can also have positive effects.
In addition, a number of cross-national union efforts have emerged, some 
of which involve international networks of unions and workers. Other union 
campaigns to pressure MNCs have linked with NGOs to make use of con­
sumer and political pressure. Overall, it appears that achieving and sustaining 
acceptable work conditions in supply chains of MNCs will require a combi­
nation of the efforts of management, labor, NGOs, and governments, perhaps 
eventually reinforced by consumer purchasing behavior.
Discussion Questions
1. Why do international production opportunities and international trade 
generally advantage multinational corporations and disadvantage unions 
in terms of bargaining power?
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2. What factors led multinational corporations historically to typically 
prefer to decentralize their internal labor relations function, leaving 
most control of labor relations issues to local plant managers?
3. What recent factors/trends are leading many multinational firms to 
move toward more central coordination of their internal labor relations 
function?
4. Why is it so difficult for unions to forge cross-national alliances and 
launch successful cross-national pressure or bargaining campaigns?
5. Describe some of the basic steps you would take as the head of labor 
relations in a large multinational firm to make sure that work 
conditions are fair and defensible in your firm’s global supply chain.
Related Web Sites
Colgate-Palmolive: http://www.colgate.com/app/Colgate/US/Corp/LivingOur
V alues/Sustainability/HomePage. evsp
Cornell International Labor Relations School International Labor Standards: https:// 
www.ilr.comell.edu/globalPortal/laborStandards/
Global Unions: Standing Together for the Rights of Unions: http://www.global 
-unions. org/ ?lang=en
Hewlett Packard Supply Chain Management: http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/
globalcitizenship/09gcreport/society/supplychain/strategy.html
Sustainable Business at Nike: http://nikeinc.com/pages/responsibility
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